In this paper I investigate the relevance of the exchange rate regime for macroeconomic 
Introduction
According to the classical model in international macro constructed by Robert Mundell and Marcus Fleming in the sixties, the central bank can pursue an active monetary policy under a floating exchange rate regime, in such a way that the exchange rate and the interest rate have a stabilizing effect on the economy. This principal argument is generally accepted, but the judgment of how important it in reality is, still remains an open question.
While it is obvious that the central bank can stabilize the economy under a floating exchange rate in the simple textbook model, the situation is more complex in practice (see e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) ). First, the central bank takes its decisions under imperfect information and monetary policy affects the economy with a lag.
According to traditional macroeconomic theory, price and wage adjustments tend to stabilize the economy. This implies that the significance of the fact that the central bank can pursue an active monetary policy under a floating exchange rate regime depends on how quickly it can react, and how quickly the monetary policy affects the economy, as compared to how quickly wages and prices adapt. Second, stabilizing output is not the only target of the central bank; in fact an inflation target is often assigned as its most important target. Third, there may be some uncertainty about the monetary policy of the central bank, which in itself generates destabilizing exchange rate movements (overshooting). This leads to several questions. Can we quantitatively say anything about the importance of the exchange rate for macroeconomic stability? What do we know empirically about the influence of the exchange rate on the economy? Is the basic proposition that the central bank can stabilize the economy under a floating exchange rate regime still valid, once we allow for reasonable lags in the implementation and effects of policy? 1 ____________ 1 A small, but growing part of the literature considers such questions. See, for instance, Svensson (2000) , Gertler (1998), (2001) , Taylor (1999) , Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry and Wolf (1997) , Ball (1999) , Batini and Haldane (1999) , Gali and Monacelli (2002) , Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Söderlind (2001) .
To shed some light on these questions, I will construct a simple model assumed to be stable across exchange rate regimes, and then simulate the hypothetical macroeconomic development under alternative exchange rate regimes in Sweden in the period . In that period, Sweden had a quasi-fixed exchange rate regime, where the Swedish currency was tied to various currencies and baskets of currencies, with three devaluations in [1976] [1977] , two devaluations at the beginning of the 1980's and finally, the large depreciation in November 1992 leading to the float of the krona (see Figure   1) . 2 This actual regime will be compared to two hypothetical regimes: first a floating exchange rate regime and second, an irrevocably fixed exchange rate. Under the floating exchange rate regime, I assume that we have an independent central bank carrying out a credible monetary policy. In the latter case, five different fixed exchange rate regimes are considered; I consider both the case when the Swedish krona is fixed to a weighted basket of currencies and the cases when it is fixed to four different currencies.
The exercise of comparing the macroeconomic development under alternative exchange rate regimes is interesting, because it provides answers to questions like:
1) How important is the exchange rate regime for macroeconomic stability, is the development about the same under the three regimes or does it substantially deviate between different exchange rate regimes?
2) What is quantitatively the central bank's possibility to stabilize the economy under a floating exchange rate regime?
3) Was the actual quasi-fixed exchange rate regime optimal from a stability point of view?
The results of my study indicate that under a floating exchange regime, the central bank can stabilize much of the macroeconomic shocks. Still, compared to the actual development, output volatility is only somewhat lower under the simulated floating exchange rate regime when the central bank has no information lags and is only interested in output stability. More precisely, under the simulated floating exchange rate regime, the central bank must pay a very high "price" in terms of volatility in exchange _______________________ rate and prices to reach the same output stability as under the actual regime. This implies that the actual policy with a fixed exchange rate and a number of devaluations was quite successful from an output stability point of view; the devaluations were well timed in relation to the business cycle. As pointed out by Edin and Vredin (1993) , Sweden tends to devalue when the economy goes into a recession. Finally, the outcomes under the hypothetical fixed exchange rate regimes are more volatile than under both the actual and the hypothetical floating exchange rate regime.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I present the theoretical model. In section 3, I describe the data and estimate the model. The potential of monetary policy to stabilize output is examined in section 4. In section 5, sensitivity analyses are performed and the case with a fixed exchange rate regime is discussed in section 6. Finally, I discuss the results and draw some conclusions in sections 7 and 8.
The Model
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the hypothetical development under different exchange rate regimes, so I need a flexible model of the econo my that works independently whether we have a fixed, a quasi fixed or a floating exchange rate. I
consider a small open economy model, similar to those of Batini and Haldane (1999) and Svensson (2000) . The model is quarterly and all variables (except the interest rate)
are measured in logs as deviations from steady state. Aggregate demand for domestically produced goods in period t is given by: 
where t e is the exchange rate, * t p the foreign price level and t p the domestic CPI price level. The real exchange rate affects the economy with a lag of s periods, since the market shares in the international market adjust slowly to changes in relative prices (see e.g. Gottfries (2002) ). β is a measure of how sensitive real output is to changes in the real exchange rate.
The parameter τ captures the effect of fiscal policy stabilization. If fiscal policy were fully flexible, it would be possible to minimize a loss function and find the optimal fiscal policy rule. Suc h flexibility in fiscal policy seems unrealistic, however, given fiscal policy decision lags, political negotiations etc. (see e.g. Alesina and Perotti (1995) , and Ohlsson and Vredin (1996) ). I therefore adopt the following reaction function for government expenditure: 
Hence, the only reason for the domestic sum of the current and expected future real interest rates to deviate from the foreign sum of the current and expected future real interest r ates is that the real exchange rate deviates from the equilibrium level.
Substituting in the new expression for the interest term (equation (5) Wages are set according to a standard wage equation (e.g. Blanchard and Katz (1999) ), where wage setters in sector j set the wage according the following equation: 
where
and a zero-mean supply shock (cost-push shock), t ε , has been added.
Assuming monopolistic competition in the domestic economy, domestic prices are set as a mark-up on wages (i.e. P is the price of domestically produced goods). Then, we get that the CPI price level is given by a weighted average of the prices of imported goods and the wage level: _____________ 5 Wages in period t depend on the expected output gap in period t+s, since wages affect output with a lag of s periods, i.e. the wage level in period t affects output (unemployment) in period t+s. Hence, wage setters have a tradeoff between high wages in period t and low output (unemployment) in period t+s.
where a is the elasticity of the CPI price level with respect to the domestic wage level.
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That is, I assume that there is no lag in the pass-through of imported costs to domestic prices of imported goods. Substituting the wage equation into the CPI equation, it is possible to express the aggregated supply equation (Phillips curve) in terms of CPI inflation:
where the CPI inflation is defined as
Thus, the CPI inflation depends on the expected CPI inflation, the future output gap, the real exchange rate ( t q ) and the cost-push shock ( t ε ). According to equation (11), higher expected inflation, increased aggregated demand or a real exchange rate depreciation will imply higher inflation.
In this model, monetary policy affects the economy through several transmission channels. First, there is a conventional real interest rate channel, working through the output gap and then onto wages and prices. Second, a change in the interest rate also affects the exchange rate, which influences aggregate demand through the price of domestic goods in terms of foreign goods, thereby affecting wages and prices. A change in the exchange rate also has a direct effect on CPI inflation through the prices of imported goods. This is the quickest and most direct channel through which monetary policy affects inflation.
Under a floating exchange rate regime, the short nominal interest rate is the instrument of the central bank. When the central bank sets the interest rate, it directly affects the exchange rate, because of the interest parity condition. In the hypothetical floating exchange rate regime, I assume that the central bank is interested in both price ______________________________ 6 The share of imported goods (1-a ) in the CPI is exactly constant if the utility function over domestic and imported goods has a constant elasticity of substitution equal to unity (Cobb-Douglas utility function), as assumed in appendix A. 
The central bank sets the short nominal interest rate, ( t i ). Using that the interest parity condition (UIP) holds, it can be said that it "sets" the exchange rate, because according to UIP, ) ( 1
From equations (13)- (15), we can see that the stability of the economy not only depends on the actual demand and supply shocks, but also on the ability of the central bank, the government and the wage setters to forecast the demand shock. This implies that given
its own forecast, the wage setters' forecast and the government's forecast of the demand shock, the central bank sets the exchange rate to stabilize the price level and/or the output, depending on the value of λ . From equation (15), we can see that the demand shock affects output in three different ways, depending on whether the shock is expected by the wage setters, the government, the central bank or completely unexpected. First, demand shocks expected by everybody have a direct effect on output, since the expected shocks are not completely compensated by changes in the real exchange rate or fiscal policy stabilization. According to equation (9), we can see that in the special case when the output gap does not affect the wage level (b = 0) and government expenditure is insensitive to changes in the output gap ( 0 = τ ) expected demand shocks will have complete penetration on output; in this case, wage setters set the wage such that the expected real exchange rate is constant. Second, the central bank will partly stabilize the output for demand shocks expected by the central bank itself, but unexpected by the wage setters depending on the value of λ . Third, shocks that are unexpected by the wage setters, the government as well as the central bank will directly affect output.
Data and parameter values

Data description
The data set covers Sweden between 1973 Q1-1994 Q2. Data on domestic real GDP (y), foreign price ( * p ), CPI price ( p ), domestic wages (hourly rates in manufacturing), government expenditure (g) and the exchange rate index (e) are collected from the OECD database Main Economic Indicator. The exchange rate index is constructed as a competition-weighted sum of exchange rate series for ten OECD countries. The foreign price index is also constructed as a competition-weighted sum of foreign price series for ten OECD countries. All variables are expressed in logs and detrended using a HodrickPrescott filter. Figure 1 illustrates the paths for the output gap, inflation, the real exchange rate and the nominal exchange rate. Appendix B provides more details on data sources and definitions for all variables. (10)) is estimated with OLS to get a measure of a , the wage equation is estimated with GMM to get a measure of b and the output equation (equation (6)) and the government reaction function (equation (3)) are estimated as a system using GMM to obtain a value of τˆand β .
Parameter values
In this section, I proceed by estimating the CPI price equation (10), the wage equation and β . Before estimating these equations, I need to assign the length of the wage setters' wage contract (k) and the consumers' decision lag (s). Wage contracts are typically valid for 1 to 3 years. In the baseline case, I assume that wage setters set the wage one year ahead and that the consumer decision lag is two quarters, i.e. k = 4 and s = 2. Thus, wage setters can affect the price level with a four-quarter lag and output with a six-quarter lag. All variables in the estimated equations are treated as stationary, since before estimating equations (3),(6), (9) and (10), all variables are detrended with a HPfilter.
The CPI price equation is individually estimated by OLS to get a measure of the elasticity of the CPI price level with respect to the domestic wage level (the value of a ).
According to Table 1 , the elasticity of the CPI price level with respect to the domestic wage level is equal to 0.86. The econometric procedure for estimating the wage equation is relatively straightforward (see e.g. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) The output equation (equation (6)) and the government reaction function (equation (3)) are estimated as a system using generalized method of moments (GMM) to get a measure of how sensitive government expenditure is to changes in the output gap (the value of τˆ) and how sensitive real output is to changes in the real exchange rate (the value of β ). Equations (3) and (6) are estimated as a system since the parameter τˆ enters both equations. As discussed in section 2, the system will contain autoregressive (AR (2)) error specifications. I use instruments of output, domestic and foreign prices, exchange rates and wages dated t-s or earlier. Furthermore, I assume that 2 n is equal to 0.3 (calculated as the average the share of government demand in total aggregate demand). According to Table 1, the empirical model works reasonably well.
Government expenditure is negatively correlated with aggregated demand and a real deprecation stimulates aggregate demand.
The central bank's preference parameter between price and output stability, λ , can be chosen in different ways, depending on the purpose of the analysis. Finally, the discount factor ( δ ) is set to 0.96. I calculate the actual path for η using the residuals from equation (6) 
Thus, η is defined as the output gap purged from the effects of variations in the real exchange rate and fiscal policy stabilization. This implies that η captures everything affecting the output gap, except influences from monetary policy and systematic fiscal policy. The supply shock (cost-push shock) is analogously calculated as the residual from the wage equation: Figure 1 illustrates the path for the two structural disturbances (η and ε ). Thus, this paper studies how the Swedish economy would have performed if it had been subjected to the same structural disturbances (η and ε ) as those that have affected it in the past while, at the same time, the monetary policy conducted by the central bank had been different.
Maximal output stabilization without policy lags
In this section, I examine the potential of monetary policy to stabilize output if we take an optimistic view of how monetary policy is conducted. 9 In order to maximize this potential, I first assume that the central bank has no information or data lag, thus 0 = m . 10 There is still a lag in the economy, since monetary policy affects the economy with a lag of two quarters. The wage contracts in Sweden are typically valid for 1 to 3 years. In the baseline case, I assume that wages are set one year ahead, i.e. 4 = k . This implies that
Second, since I want to highlight the potential for monetary policy to stabilize output, I
initially focus on the case when , 1 . 0 = λ thus the central bank is most interested in
The central bank is generally considered to put most weight on price stability (characterized by an explicit inflation target). But to get a more fair comparison between the actual and the hypothetical regime, I examine the potential of monetary policy to stabilize output, since the actual policy can be characterized as an "output stability target" during most of the period between 1974 and 1994. 10 I will later investigate how sensitive the results are to the assumption that there is no data lag. Figure   2 , and the stability properties are reported in Table 2 . Comparing the simulated regime with the actual regime, we can make three important observations: (i) the simulated According to table, 2 η is more volatile than actual output. In Figure 5 , we can see that there is a negative correlation between the real exchange rate and the real output in the period 1974-1994. This is a pattern found by Edin and Vredin (1993) ; the probability of a devaluation increased when growth was low (declining industry production). Thus, the real exchange rate appeared to have had a stabilizing effect on output in this period, which implies that the actual policy with a fixed exchange rate and a number of devaluations was quite successful from a stability point of view. Comparing the volatility of the simulated output with η , we note that the variance of y is about 1.5 times smaller than that of η : It seems that under a floating exchange rate, the central bank could have used the exchange rate to stabilize output.
According to figure 2, the actual real exchange rate and the hypothetical real exchange rate almost coincide, but we can also see why the hypothetical regime has a somewhat lower output volatility. For examp le, during the second half of the 1980's, both regimes had a real appreciation that damped the boom, but the hypothetical regime had a larger dampening effect because it implied a faster real appreciation of the exchange rate. 
Sensitivity analysis
Trading output stability against price stability
Usually, the main goal of the central bank under a floating exchange rate regime is to maintain price stability and, without prejudice to this goal, the central bank should try to support the general economic policy to reach such goals as high sustainable growth and full employment. To reach these goals the central bank usually has targets (operational _________________________ goals) such as an inflation/price level target. For example, since 1993, Sweden has had an explicit inflation target of two percent per year.
So far, I have assumed that the central bank is most interested in output stability and puts very little weight on stabilizing the price level. However, in reality, the central bank should be interested in both output and price stability, so that the value of λ be higher. Table 3 . From Table 3 , we can see that the price stability is quite sensitive to changes in λ . Figure 3 reports simulated series of output, the exchange rate, prices and the real exchange rate when the central bank has a flexible price level target
Comparing Figures 2 and 3, we can see that an increasing λ leads to a more stable pattern for prices and both nominal and real exchange rates, but at the cost of an increase in the standard deviation of detrended output. 
Changing the inflation trend
Besides having a stabilizing effect on the real economy and prices, the central bank Figure 4 , the simulated nominal exchange rate has a time trend reflecting a continuous appreciation of the Swedish krona because under the simulated regime, Sweden had a lower inflation rate than its foreign trade partners most of the time.
Information/implementation lags
So far, I have assumed that the central bank has no data /information lag but in reality, it takes at least three to four months before preliminary data become available and then, additional time to analyze the data and take policy decisions. In Table 4 , the standard deviations of output, exchange rate and CPI-price level are reported when we have a one-year decision/information lag.
13 According to Table 4 the volatility in the price level and the exchange rate is reduced but the volatility in output is increased when including an information lag. The reason for this is that the central bank makes smaller changes in the exchange rate in this case, since its ability to forecast η is substantially reduced. 
An irrevocably fixed exchange rate
Suppose instead that Sweden had had a truly fixed exchange rate during the period 1974-1994. Five different fixed exchange rate regimes are considered, first that the Swedish krona is fixed in terms of a weighted basket of currencies and second, that the krona is tied to four different currencies. For this purpose, I modify the theoretical model so that the central bank cannot influence the economy and then, I calculate the hypothetical development under the five-fixed exchange rate regimes.
Theory
I will use the model described in section 2. The only modification in this case is that we have no domestic monetary policy, because the only task for the central bank under a fixed exchange rate regime is to keep the exchange rate fixed. Thus, only the wage setter and the government's fiscal policy can stabilize the economy. The output equation (6) will be exactly the same as before and I assume the wage setters set the wage in the same way as before (equation (9)). Solving the model in the case of a fixed exchange rate regime, we get the following expressions for the CPI price level, exchange rate and output: 
where * t e is the foreign exchange rate to which the Swedish krona is tied. From equation (21), it is easily seen that the macroeconomic stability depends on how sensitive government expenditure is to changes in the output gap (the value of τ ) and the wage setter's ability to forecast the foreign price level, the exchange rate, the demand shock, the supply shock and the covariance between these variables.
Results
The paths for the foreign price level, η and ε will be the same as before (see Figure 1) .
In the case when the krona is fixed to a single currency, the exchange rate index is constructed as previously with the only difference that in this case, the Swedish krona is tied to its host currency. The currency basket is constructed of ten different currencies where the weights are based on the shares of Swedish export to each country.
Using the wage setter's forecasts and the actual path for η ,ε , the foreign price level and the exchange rate, we have all the necessary information to calculate hypothetical output and prices under the fixed exchange rate regimes.
14 Table 5 reports the standard deviation of the output gap and the CPI-prices for the five regimes. From that and wage setters have difficulties in forecasting the movements of the exchange rate. Thus, the exchange rate affects the real economy, which implies that the covariance between ε η , and the exchange rate is the main reason for differences between regimes.
The only case that substantially deviates from the other fixed exchange rate arrangement is when the krona is fixed to the U.S. dollar. In this case, the real exchange rate clearly had a destabilizing effect on the economy. Comparing the hypothetical floating exchange rate regime (when 0 = m and 1 . 0 = λ ) to the simulated fixed exchange rate regime: It seems that the central bank makes a good job in stabilizing output, because output volatility is about 1.3 times higher if the exchange rate is fixed to the currency basket or to any of the European currencies and more than 1.6 times higher if the exchange rate is fixed to the U.S. dollar, as compared to the volatility under the simulated floating exchange rate regime. However, the CPIprices are substantially more volatile under the simulated floating exchange rate regime.
If we instead compare a more realistic case when the central bank has an one-year information lag and λ is equal to one, the output gap volatility is about the same under the simulated fixed and floating exchange rate regimes. However, in this case, prices are more volatile under fixed regimes than under the simulated floating exchange rate regime.
Why such low output volatility under the actual exchange rate regime?
Comparing the actual exchange rate regime with the hypothetical floating or fixed exchange rate regime, the actual regime seems successful from a stability point of view.
More precisely, under the hypothetical floating exchange rate regime, the central bank must pay a very high "price" in terms of volatility in the exchange rate and prices to reach the same output stability as under the actual regime.
To understand how this apparently successful exchange rate policy came about, it is useful to briefly review what factors shaped the policy responses in this period. 15 The macroeconomic development in the Bretton Woods period was calm,
where the cyclical swings in the economy were fairly small. With this experience, the established approach toward macroeconomic shocks became one where these could and should be dealt with by a fixed exchange rate and a countercyclical fiscal policy. Thus, when the world economy was hit by the first oil price shock in 1973-1974, OPEC I, the Swedish reaction was determined by the belief that the expected international downturn can be avoided by an expansionary fiscal policy.
The policy resulted in a growing budget deficit, an increased tax burden, a deficit in the current account and a serious "cost crisis". With a fixed exchange rate, this lead to a dramatic loss of competitiveness of Swedish exports and an increase in relative prices.
Competition was partially restored when Sweden left the "currency snake" and In summary, the actual exchange rate policy appears successful from an output stability point of view, because we devalued at the beginning of each recession, and a fixed exchange rate and high inflation implied a real appreciation during booms.
Conclusions
In this paper, I have studied how Swedish output, inflation and exchange rates Figure 2 , the actual and the hypothetical real exchange rates almost coincide. Hence, the actual exchange rate regime was more like an optimal floating or "managed" exchange rate than a fixed exchange rate regime. Finally, the real exchange rate had a stabilizing effect on output under the hypothetical floating exchange rate regime, which indicates that the central bank's monetary policy had a stabilizing effect on output.
______________ 16 Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry and Wolf (1997) also reported that the exchange rate regime has an effect on macroeconomic stability. But Flood and Rose (1995) reported that the volatility of macroeconomic variables does not change a great deal across exchange rate regimes.
where t c denotes the deviation from the trend of aggregate real consumption and r r t − is the real interest rate deviation from a long-run mean interest rate. Let aggregate consumption be a Cobb-Douglas function of consumption of domestic and foreign goods (that is, assuming a constant elasticity of substitution equal to unity). Then, it follows that the consumer's decision problem can be written as: .00
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